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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC
IN CAMPBELLS

PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC

Joel Weinsheimer

My view of this question is, as it happens, very
simple....It is not in the nature of man to attain a
science [episteme] by the possession of which we can
know positively what we should do or what we should

say.
----- Isocrates, Antidosis

In recent years George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776)’
has been so often and thoroughly contextualized in the history
of rhetoric, the history of logic, and the history of ideas that
I can plead some excuse for treating here it in a different way.
Rather than repeating or even extending the admirable work of
Howell, Bitzer, Ehninger, Bevilacqua, and Bormann—that is,
instead of situating The Philosophy of Rhetoric historically—I
propose to treat it as philosophy. By that I mean taking
seriously its truth claim and thinking through some of the
fundamental questions it raises in order to say something not
just about Campbell and his book but about the philosophy of
rhetoric.
By employing the title Philosophy of Rhetoric, Campbell
meant to emphasize that his work occupies the third among

1 Cited below from Lloyd F. Bitzer's second edition (Carbondale:
Illinois University Preu, 1988].
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the three levels o£ rhetorical knowledge. The first level is that
the orator himself, who though no philosopher is not entirely
without knowledge, since he knows how to speak well.
Second, as distinct from the rhetor’s largely intuitive know
how, the rhetorician possesses reflective knowledge, including
the taxonomy of rhetorical kinds and devices as well as rules
for deploying them to best effect. Finally, a third-level know
ledge distinguishes the philosopher from both the rhetorician
and rhetor. This too is reflective knowledge, but the philoso
pher knows not just the rhetorical rules per st; he knows the
principles that explain why they work.
One reason for Campbell’s concentration on the third, or
philosophical, level of rhetorical knowledge is that he believed
the second had been already perfected and exhausted by the
early rhetoricians: "Considerable progress had been made by
the ancient Greeks and Romans, in devising the proper rules of
composition,’’ he writes; "and I must acknowledge that, as far
as I have been able to discover, there has been little or no
improvement in this respect made by the moderns’’ (Ixxv).
With the territory of rhetoric proper thus already occupied,
the "new country” still remaining to be discovered by rhetor
ical reflection could only be that of philosophical principle.
For Campbell, the specific philosophical principles that
explain the functioning of rhetorical rules are those of human
nature—which, since Locke and Hume, meant the principles
of psychology. Nothing is more characteristic of Campbell’s
philosophy than his appeal to empiricist epistemology, and yet
this dependence also explains in large part why The Philosophy
of Rhetoric has rarely received much attention as philosophy.'
Lloyd Bitzer argues that “major elements of Hume’s
view...were taken over by Campbell without significant
modification.”1 Dennis Bormann, on the other hand, shows
that “Campbell’s overall philosophical outlook, was almost
identical’’ to that of the explicitly anti-Humean Scottish

2 In The Philosophy of Rhetoric (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936), 7, I. A.
Richards affirms, "[Whatley’s] claim—that Rhetoric must go deep, must take a
broad philosophical view of the principles of the Art—is the climax of his
Introduction; and yet in the treatise that follows nothing of the sort is attempted,
nor is it in any other treatise that I know of.” Richards’ sweeping denigration is
clearly meant to include Campbell.
3 “Hume’s Philosophy in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric," Philosophy
and Rhetoric, 2 (1969): 140.
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Common Sense School.4
Still others consider Bacon the
predominant influence? We need not attempt to resolve this
dispute here, for the relevant point is that in the general rush
to identify Campbell’s sources no one has made a serious claim
for his philosophical originality; and insofar as Campbell’s
empirical epistemology merely reiterates that of his predeces
sors, it does not repay our attention.
Campbell’s claim to our interest, then, must rest not on the
philosophy per se but on its application to rhetoric. What is
indeed striking about this application, I think, is that it shows
how very unsuited was eighteenth century philosophy to the
purpose of conceptualizing rhetoric. Particularly, as I will try
to show, the epistemological conception of knowledge and
instrumental conception of language that Campbell inherited
from his predecessors could not do justice to the nature of
rhetoric, even as Campbell himself conceived it. And it is in
just these respects, namely the ways in which his views cannot
be comprehended within the Locke-Hume tradition, that
Campbell's philosophy of rhetoric is of more than historical
interest.
Campbell offers us two touchstone definitions of rhetoric;
first, it is “the grand art of communication, not of ideas only,
but of sentiments, passions, dispositions, and purposes” (Ixxiii);
second, rhetoric is the "art or talent by which the discourse is
adapted to its end” (])? Most evident in the generality of these
definitions is Campbell’s centrifugal impulse toward broadening
and indeed universalizing the province of rhetoric?
By
expanding its end beyond persuading to include informing as
well, and by including the transmission of not only ideas but

4 Dennis R. Bormann, “Some 'Common Sense' about Campbell, Hume, and Reid
The Extrinsic Evidence," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 71 (1985): 396
G P
Mohrmann argues that Campbell's filiation with Scottish Commonsensism led him
to reject empiricist psychology in many respects. See Mohrmann's "George
Campbell: The Psychological Background." Western Speech Journal, 32 (1968)
99-104.
5 See Vincent Bevilacqua, ’Philosophical Origins of George Campbell's Philosophy
of RhetoricSpeech Monographs, 32 (1965); 1-12; and W. S. Howell, Eighteenth
Century British Logic ana Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 1971),
577-612.
6 (n Campbell's Cura Prima, this second, instrumentalist definition had pride ol
place.
See Dennis R. Bormann, “George Campbell's Cura Prima on Elo
quence—1758," Quarterly journal of Speech, 74 (1988|: 35-51.
7 W. S. Howell makes this point in Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric,
579.
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also emotions and desires, Campbell makes rhetoric all-in
clusive, spanning the entire gamut of linguistic communication.
“It is the intention of eloquence," he writes, "to convey our
sentiments into the minds of others, in order to produce a
certain effect upon them. Language is the only vehicle by
which this conveyance can he made" (139). No longer limited
to a special use of language (say, the persuasive) nor to a
special kind of language (say, the ornate), the sphere of rhetoric
expands under Campbell's touch to become coextensive with
the sphere of language generally.
Whatever the real advantages of emancipating rhetoric from
its confines as a special and occasional an (and we will return
to them in conclusion), the disadvantages are many. Most
important, equating rhetoric with language works not to define
but to eliminate it, insofar as philosophy of rhetoric is reduced
to and displaced by philosophy of language. This displacement
is especially unfortunate when that language philosophy is
preoccupied with the limits, dangers, and imperfections of its
object. Campbell's definition of rhetoric as the “an of com
munication" sounds relatively innocuous and vague, but the
word communication resonates with the special associations it
had accrued from philosophy of language during the preceding
century. Locke, for example, recommended that his readers
“distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge, and
of communicating it; between the method of raising any
science, and that of teaching it to others" (4.7.11). In this
respect, he follows the Port Royal Logic, which distinguished
two kinds of method: “one for discovering truth and the
other for explaining it to others.'" Adopting this distinction
between inquiry and instruction, Campbell himself asserted in
his Lecturer on Pulpit Eloquence that "to know is one thing, and
to be capable of communicating it another.”
Defining rhetoric specifically as communication implies not
only its enlargement to comprehend the sphere of all language
but its confinement, disenfranchisement, and tacit depreciation,
insofar as the sphere of all language is itself circumscribed and
belated. Like his predecessors, Campbell makes the common
sense assumption that you must know something before you
can tell it to others. The consequence is that language and

8 Cited in Vincent M. Bevilacqua, “Philosophical Origins,' Sn.
9 Reprinted in Preacher and Pastort ed Edwards A. Park (Andover: Allen, Morrill
and Wardwell, 1845), 154
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rhetoric are relegated to a strictly secondary and contingent
position.
This thesis—that knowing is prior to and independent of
saying—means that knowing is an essentially private act.
Humans are mute and insular beings, and the numan way of
knowing is correspondingly solitary. The secondariness of
language (and of the social compact, the locus of which is
language) is a corollary of the epistemological individualism
fundamental to philosophy of knowledge from Descartes to
Kant. Its basic tenet is tnat a single mind can, and in fact
must, know alone. By contrast to a dialogical epistemology
for which knowing means (inter alia) being able to say what
one knows, eighteenth-century epistemological individualism is
essentially monological. The basic question raised by Camp
bell's definition of rhetoric as communication, then, is whether
monological epistemology can produce anything but implicit
denigration ol rhetoric, since on this view rhetoric appears
pedagogical at best and at worst prejudicial.
Campbell’s second definition of rhetoric, "the art by which
discourse is adapted to its end,” is even more emphatically
monological. From this definition it follows that rhetoric is
a means to an end, namely affecting one's hearers, and the an
of rhetoric consists in maximizing the efficacy of means to
ends. On a dialogical view of human nature, one that begins
from the premise that man is a social animal, rhetoric is always
an expression of that nature, and need have no other end. For
monological epistemology, by contrast, rhetoric is never
autotelic; it is always instrumental, always in the service of
some end other than itself.10
As practice of rhetoric is utilitarian, so the second-level art
of rhetoric is tactical in character. By universalizing rhetoric,
Campbell's monological philosophy of rhetoric subjectivizes
language. “Discourse adapted to its end” is language at the
service of consciousness and will. Conceived as an instrument
at the disposal of the speaking subject, rhetoric can hardly
escape the stigma of being intrinsically self-interested and

Douglas W. Ehninger states that Campbell is in (act one o( the originators of
10
“the common assumption that rhetoric studies the adaptation o( means to ends."
See “George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional Theory," Southern Speech
Journal, 15 (1950): 270.
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manipulative." The ends it serves are manifold (informing,
pleasing, motivating, etc.) hut, generally speaking, Campbell
argues, they all involve various kinds of effect on the audience.
“It is not,” he writes, “ultimately the justness either of the
thought or of the expression which is the aim of the orator;
but it is the effect to be produced in the hearers” (215). Such
an assertion betrays its monological, individualist roots in two
ways. Most conspicuously, Campbell describes the end of
rhetoric as an effect. Monological rhetoric elicits effects, not
replies. Second, the effect on the hearers is monological in
being unilateral: effective speaking does not view itself as
affected reciprocally by the audience.
Such rhetoric, then, consists in a one-way transaction
whereby the speaking subject causes, by verbal means con
sciously adapted to their ends, desired effects in the hearing
object. Monological rhetoric not only subjectifies the speaker;
it objectifies the audience. When hearers are conceived not
dialogically as potential respondents but monologically as a
field of effects, tnen (as Campbell admits) rhetoric can disavow
responsibility for not only the “justness of the thought”—its
truth—but even “the justness of the expression”—its correctness
in grammar and diction (215). If, as Campbell affirms, “the
merit of every kind of rhetorical excellence is to be ascertained
by the effect” (332), then the speech producing that effect need
not be elegant, or precise, or true. It doesn't even matter
whether it is speech.
Indeed the cause-effect terminology
typical of monological philosophy of language finally removes
rhetoric from the province of language altogether: many kinds
of forces can cause effects; only language can elicit rejoinders.
Replies are not effects; they cannot be caused in any strict
sense. In monologue, what is specific to language is precluded,
and rhetoric which had seemed coextensive with all language
is now excluded from it.
Rhetoric, monologically conceived, can be abstracted not
only from reference to language but from reference to hearers
as well. We have seen that in Campbell's view rhetoric and its
effect stand in a relation of means to end. Now we need to

11 “The custom of classifying speeches in terms of the purpose of the speaker
rather than the function of the judge (hearrr) stems ultimately from Campbell."
writes Douglas Ehnungcr in "Campbell, Blair, and Whately Revisited," Southern
Speech Journal, 28 (196 3) 181.
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see that the means-ends relation obtains between language and
its speaker, not just between language and audience.
In contemplating a human creature, [Campbell writes] the
most natural division of the subject is the common
division into soul and body...Analogous to this there are
two things in every discourse which principally claim
our attention, the sense and the expression; or in other
words, the thought and the symbol by which it is
communicated. These may be said to constitute the soul
and the body of an oration...For, as in man, each of these
constituent parts hath its distinctive attributes, and as the
perfection of the latter consisteth in its fitness for serving
the purposes of the former, so it is precisely with those
two essential parts of every speech, the sense and the
expression. Now, it is by the sense that rhetoric holds
of logic, and by the expression that she holds of gram
mar. (32)

At this point, monological individualism comes into its own.
We lose sight of hearers and audiences entirely, as Campbell
defines rhetoric by reference to one person only, the speaker.
Like the single human being, rhetoric is of a hybrid character.
Composed of sense and expression, logic and grammar, matter
and form, the dual nature of rhetoric corresponds to that of
body and soul. Just as important here, it corresponds to the
dualism immanent in epistemological individualism as well. If
“to know is one thing, and to be capable of communicating it
another,” as Campbell writes, it is patent that discourse has
two elements (sentiment and symbol), and one is a means
subservient to the other. As body serves soul, grammar assists
logic, expression conveys sense—or, as the common phrase has
it, “language is a means of communication.”
Campbell’s instrumental conception of expression parallels
his utilitarian conception of rhetoric, except that it is still more
individualist, since “expression,” as Campbell defines it, is
expression-of, not expression-to. Monological rhetoric, that is,
need not be defined as communication, since the process “by
which the discourse is adapted to its end” (1), of fitting
expression to sense, can be entirely mute and inward. As
monological rhetoric anticipates no reply, this fit too is
unilateral insofar as sense is prior to and unaffected by the
choice of means for expressing it. Campbell’s image is perfect
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ly familiar: rhetoric, the art of adapting discourse to sense,
consists in selecting words for a pregiven idea from a pregiven
pool.
The philosophy of language implicit in this image
reflects the commonsense notion not only that knowing
precedes saying but that there are lots of ways of saying
something. Some expressions are more, some less exact, and
the task is to find the ones that are more so.
Finding them constitutes what Campbell calls “grammatical
truth.” As “logical truth” consists in the correspondence of
“sentiment to the nature of things,” so grammatical truth
“consisteth in the conformity of the expression to the senti
ment” (214).12
That is, grammatical truth or perspicacity
consists in the coincidence of what is said and what is meant.
Abstracted from reference to the audience, then, monological
rhetoric, composed of logic and grammar, has respectively two
kinds of truth as its ends, both of which understand truth as
a kind of correspondence. Many objections have been raised
to the correspondence theory of “logical truth,” of course, but
it is “grammatical truth” that is ol more interest here. Are
there similar problems with the correspondence theory of
grammar, and the pool image of choosing diction? What could
be objected against conceiving rhetoric as finding the right
(grammatically true) words for one’s ideas?
This is the
question whether language can be rightly understood as a
means and rhetoric as communication.
To answer this question, we need to recall the three levels
of rhetoric with which we began: that of the rhetor, the
rhetorician, and the philosopher of rhetoric.
Insofar as
Campbell expands the province of rhetoric to comprehend
language and speech generally, the three rhetorical levels
correspond to the knowledge of the speaker, the grammarian,
and the philosopher of language. All of these levels involve
knowledge, Campbell insists, even the first.

Though in all the arts, the first rough drafts, or imperfect
attempts, that are made, precede every thing that can be
termed criticism, they do not precede every thing that
can be termed knowledge...This knowledge must of
necessity precede even those rudest and earliest es-

12 On the former, see C. W. Edney, "George Campbell’s Theory of Logical
Truth," Speech Monographs, 15 (1948): 19-32.
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says...Something must be known, before any thing in this
way, with a view to an end, can be undertaken to be
done. (Ixxvi)

Even talking, speech untutored by the rhetorician, involves
what might be called precritical knowledge. Does it also
involve using language instrumentally, “with a view to an end”?
On the one hand, Campbell expands the sphere of rhetoric to
coincide with that of all language. On the other, he conceives
of rhetorical practice in terms of cause / effect and means /
end relations. Thus, identifying rhetoric with language requires
him to think of not only oratory but language generally as a
“means” of communication, a “use” of language. If it turns out
that not all language can be understood instrumentally, then
either rhetoric must be confined only to language that is “used”
or, if it is broadly identified with all language, then rhetoric
can no longer be conceived solely in terms of utility. The
question Campbell raises, then, is this: how does the precritical knowledge implicit in artless speech relate to the epistemic
knowledge characteristic of the rhetorician and philosopher of
rhetoric.
Campbell wants to claim that all three are continuous, for
practical know-how is knowledge too. Not all knowledge is of
the same kind, however, and practical knowledge does not
belong to the highest kind. “The imperfect and indigested state
in which knowledge must always be found in the mind that is
self-taught,” he writes, “deserves not be dignified with the title
of Science” (Ixxvi). Thus the earliest attempts have no claim to
be called art, for “All art is founded in science.” In this
emphatic maxim, with which Campbell opens his book, he
presents the art of rhetoric, like all art, in a technological
way—namely, as the application of science—and science he
conceives as theoretical knowledge. Campbell’s technological
philosophy of an is a function of his epistemic philosophy of
Knowledge.13

13 In "Rhetoric Resituated at the End of Philosophy," Quarterly Journal of Speech,
71 (1985): 168, Calvin Schrag shows that the deconstruction of philosophy which
undermines the epistemological paradigm invites a parallel deconstruction of
rhetoric. The latter would begin with an examination of the factors that have
contributed to the development of rhetoric into a manual of techniques and
classification of tropes in discursive practices. With the advent of modern
thought, in which everything becomes 'method,' these tendencies...become
sedimented and formalized. Hence, the first moment in a deconstructionist

236

1650-1850

The premise underlying his technological vision is that
epistemic or theoretical knowledge is higher than practical
knowledge. Rhetorical practice not governed by science must
be "awkward," just as the practical knowledge that precedes
theoretical or scientific knowledge must be "imperfect and
indigested." We have seen above that in Campbell’s monological philosophy of rhetoric, knowing is prior to saying. Now
we can add that for his epistemology knowing is prior to doing
as well. The theoretical knowledge of the rhetorician and
philosopher of rhetoric precedes and enables artful practice, for
that practice (technologically conceived) is applied theory. Or
in Campbell's words, “All art is founded in science."14
Like that of physics, optics, and other natural sciences, the
future of rhetoric justifies a Baconian optimism about the new
prospects it promises to open up: "our acquaintance with
nature and its laws is so much extended, that we shall be
enabled, in numberless cases, not only to apply to the most
profitable purposes the knowledge we have thus acquired, but
to determine beforehand, with sufficient certainty, the success
of every new application" (Ixx). Understood on this tech
nological model, science consists of general laws and principles
that enable prediction and control; an is nature controlled by
science. Correlatively, rhetorical science consists in the rules
and principles of language; rhetorical an is natural language
self-consciously governed by them.
Campbell does not employ the technological model wholly
without reservation, however, and in fact the ways he suggests
of superseding it are the focus of his interest for us. Even if
rhetorical science is logically prior to the an it governs,
Campbell is enough of an empiricist to insist that the science
of rhetoric is itself dependent on artless practice. No less than
any other empirical science, rhetorical Knowledge is founded
wholly upon experience and derives all its authority from it.
The difficulty which this derivation presents to Campbell’s

approach to rhetoric falls out as a thinking against method, particularly when
method is construed as mere technique." The present essay participates in the
general project Schrag sketches out, though it allies itself not so much with
deconstruction as hermeneutics. See in 16 below.
14 In “‘All An is Founded in Science,'" Rhetoric Society Quarterly,
(1983): 14,
Lloyd Bitzer contends that this maxim "led to |Campbell's) central error, which
was the (often forced) reduction of rhetorical terms and principles to psychological
terms and principles." My contention is that the error is still more basic, namely
the reduction to science of what is no science.
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technological view of art becomes most apparent in his
treatment of logic and grammar, the two subsciences of which
rhetoric is composed. We recall that “it is by the sense that
rhetoric holds of logic, and by the expression that she holds of
grammar" (32). Significantly, Campbells most memorable and
influential arguments explicitly reject the notion that logical
and grammatical practice is improved by the application of
rules and laws.
That is, he undermines the fundamental
premise of technology.
With respect to logic, Campbell argues, “The method of
proving by syllogism, appears... both unnatural and prolix. The
rules laid down for distinguishing the conclusive from the
inconclusive forms of argument, are at once cumbersome to the
memory, and unnecessary in practice. Ko person, one may
venture to pronounce, will ever be made a reasoner, who
stands in need of them" (62). In the headlong rout of scholasti
cism, it comes to seem that the logical rules of validity, so
laboriously raised to theoretical explicitness over the centuries,
not only do not govern practice; they are “unnecessary" to
it—unnecessary in the sense of being already obvious and
immanent, and so unnecessary to import, as it were, from
without. Likewise, the rules of grammar have no authority
over grammatical usage.15 Quite the contrary, Campbell warns,
“it ought to be remembered, that use well established must give
law to grammar, and not grammar to use" (392). Thus, “to the
tribunal of use, as to the supreme authority,...we are entitled
to appeal from the laws and the decisions of grammarians; and
this order of subordination ought never, on any account, to be
reversed" (141).
The main point to be emphasized here is that if usage is the
authority of last resort, then grammatical practice is superior
to every possible codification of it, that is, to all purely
theoretical knowledge of it. The criterion of good usage is not
a rule, an abstraction extrinsic to usage; it is usage itself. The
standard of grammar is not theoretical;
it is grammatical
practice. This hardly means chat in grammar anything goes,
which is patently not the case. The point is not that gram
matical use obeys no law; it is auto-nomos, its own law; and
it obeys none separable from itself. Practices such as grammar,

For a detailed treatment, tee Thomas Frank, "Linguistic Theory and the
Doctrine of Usage," Lingua e ftile, 20 (1985): 199-216.
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which are subject to immanent critique alone, are not lawless,
though their laws are indivisible from the application of them.
More exactly, autonomous practice cannot be described in
terms of application—the application of a universal law to the
concrete instance. If such application is the defining characteris
tic of technology, we can say that precritical practice is not
implicit or imperfect technology; it is no technology—and no
worse off for that.
If neither logic nor grammar, the two constituent parts of
rhetoric, can be theorized technologically, in terms of abstract
universals, the question arises whether the same pertains to
rhetoric itself. Aligning himself with the tradition of Aristotle
rather than Isocrates, Campbell very much wants to show that
the art of rhetoric has formulable rules and so can claim the
dignity of being a science. “In almost every art, even as used
by mere practitioners,” he asserts, “there are certain
rules...which must be carefully followed” (Ixx). The notion of
art as “following rules” makes it seem that in rhetoric, as in
any other art, first the rules exist—at least implicitly—and the
rest “follows.” And if the rules precede practice, they can be
abstracted from it and made explicit—that is, made into a
science. For Campbell and the epistemological tradition, all
knowing consists of knowing rules, and following even implicit
rules counts as knowing them.
So Campbell is willing to
admit that practice involves knowledge—though until the rules
are formulated, it is dim knowledge, “imperfect and un
digested.” Campbell’s negative valuation of practical know
ledge results from his taking science as normative for all
knowledge, and science is understood epistemically: as the
kind of knowledge that is abstractable from practice.
Yet we have seen that, even for Campbell, logic and
grammar represent a kind of knowledge that is not susceptible
of abstract theorization and is nevertheless not inferior to theo
retic knowledge. This nonscientific cognition can be called
practical knowledge so long as we keep in mind that what
distinguishes it is not the absence of norms but their im
manence to practice, just as the distinctive quality of theoretic
knowledge is the duality of the two. If like logic and gram
mar, rhetoric too belongs to the sphere of practical knowledge,
then Campbell is not compelled to make the impossible choice
between forcing rhetoric into the natural-scientific model of
knowledge or disparaging it as at best unscientific. If there is
another kind of knowledge—the practical—then either some
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nonsciences have a claim to dignity or else there are real
sciences—moral sciences, perhaps, or human sciences—which do
not conform to the epistemic model.16
Campbell in fact goes a good way toward displacing the
rule-based model of rhetoric because ne continually calls into
question the sufficiency of rhetorical rules to rhetorical
practice.
Underlying their insufficiency one fundamental
reason stands out: rhetoric is always concrete practice insofar
as addressed (to a concrete audience) and occasioned (by a
concrete situation). Concerned wholly with audience, chapters
7 and 8 of The Philosophy of Rhetoric are paired together as
their titles indicate: "Of the Consideration which the Speaker
ought to have of the Hearers as Men in general” and "Of the
consideration which the Speaker sought to have of the Hearers,
as such Men in particular." Writing about men in general,
Campbell, the epistemologist in the Locke-Hume tradition, is
in his stride. By his definition, philosophy of rhetoric consists
in explaining rhetorical rules by reference to the principles of
human nature, that of "men in general." But whereas chapter
seven, devoted to generalizations about a generic audience,
occupies some twenty five pages, its companion piece occupies
only one. When it comes to dealing with rhetoric proper,
concrete discourse addressed to “men in particular," the
epistemologist has nothing to say.
We recall that for Campbell rhetoric consists in conveying
“our sentiments into the minds of others, in order to produce
a certain effect upon them" (139). Yet in regard to producing
effects on particular rather than generic audiences, he admits,
“It is impossible with any precision to reduce these effects to
rules;
so much depending on the different tempers and
sentiments of different audiences" (89). Even though “the
difference between one audience and another is very great"

16 In his pioneering article. 'On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic' Central States
Speech Journal, 18 (1967): 9-17, Robert L. Scon concludes. 'In human affairs,
then, rhetoric...is a way of knowing; it is epistemic’’ (16). I follow Scon's lead
in insisting on the cognitive function of rhetoric, but mv point is that episteme,
strictly understood, is not the highest or the sole ideal of cognition. That is, not
all real knowledge—and. in particular, not all rhetorical knowledge—is epistemic.
See also Scott's 'On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later,' Central
States Speech Journal, 27 (1976): 258-66. There (261) Scott alludes to the new
conception of rhetoric which follows from Gadamer’s hermeneutic subversion of
epistemology in Truth and Method. See my Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading
of Truth ana Method (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985) and Philosophical
Hermeneutics and Literary Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).
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(95), Campbell the philosopher has virtually nothing to say
about particular audiences—the audiences specific to rhetor
ic—for the simple reason that generalizations, broad rules,
epistemic generalizations are designed precisely to obviate
consideration of the particular and the concrete—the province
of rhetoric.
Thus he closes his empty chapter—the chapter on the
audience of rhetoric as such—as follows: "As the characters of
audiences may be infinitely diversified,... the influence they
ought to have respectively upon the speaker must be obvious
to a person of discernment" (96). Even if this dismissive
gesture is designed to mask the chapter’s vacuity, it neverthe
less raises questions concerning audience influence and rhetor
ical discernment that repay our attention. Once a speaker
begins thinking about addressing a particular audience and
adapting himself to it, then it becomes clear that along with
the speaker's effect on the audience, the audience is likewise
exercising an influence on the speaker.
At the point of
particularity, the point of rhetoric as concrete practice, we can
no longer view rhetorical effect as unilateral, for the rhetorical
situation becomes at the very least a tissue of reciprocal effects.
Just as important, the particularities of the audience problematize the technological view of rhetoric as well. At the point of
particularity, where general rules suited to generic audiences
leave off and the rhetorical technologist is consequently at a
loss, the person of discernment steps in. Neither lawless nor
merely obedient to abstract rhetorical laws, discernment
consists in seeing the law immanent in the concrete particular.
To the discerning speaker it is evident from the situation itself
what needs to be said and done.
When it comes to the
particular, practical knowledge can claim superiority to
epistemic science
The discernment necessary for the discourse in general is no
less needed at the level of the sentence:

Rhetoricians have generally prescribed that a period
should not consist of more than four members. For my
own part, as members of sentences differ exceedingly
both in length and in structure from one another, 1 do
not see how any general rule can be established to
ascertain their number. .. The only rule which will never
fail, is to beware of both prolixity and of intricacy; and
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the only competent judges in the case are good sense and
a good ear. (372)

If so—if rules and principles can never obviate the need for
good judgment, and if rhetoricians and philosophers of rhetoric
can therefore never supply all the rhetor’s needs—then perhaps
it is not entirely the case that "all art is founded on science.”17
Practice cannot be wholly theorized because it always involves
an element of nontheoretic knowledge—whether that is called
practical intuition, judgment, or good sense. For this reason,
rhetorical practice cannot be exhaustively described in terms of
epistemic Knowledge and its application in technology. In
brief, there can be no epistemology of rhetoric, as long as
episteme retains the meaning it has nad since Plato.
Campbell recognizes as much when he writes, “The science
is of little value which does not serve as a foundation to some
beneficial art...Valuable knowledge...always leads to some
practical skill, and is perfected in it” (Ixix). The notion that
the value of knowledge consists in its utility already suggests
that practice is the ultimate criterion of cognitive value, but
practical utility is usually understood in a technological way.
This understanding is precluded in Campbell’s last clause.
There he affirms that knowledge is “perfected” in practice, and
thus practice cannot be conceived merely as applied science, as
technology, since it alters and perfects that science. This is a
far cry from Campbell’s assertion, discussed above, that the
knowledge of an orator untutored in rhetoric remains in an
"imperfect and undigested state.” For now Campbell’s point
is not that practical knowledge needs to be refined, abstracted,
and raised to the dignity of science. Quite the opposite, he is
asserting that rhetorical science is perfected in concrete practice.
Rhetoric becomes most scientific—though least epistemic—in

17 It is at such moments, when Campbell is willing to trust good sense over
science, that he is closest to the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid. On
the relation of the two, see Bormann, "Some 'Common Sense,” cited in n4 above;
and Vincent M. Bevilacqua, "Campbell, Priestley, and the Controversy Concerning
Common Sense," Southern Speech Journal, 30 (1964): 79-98. In "Campbell, Vico,
and the Rhetorical Science of Human Nature," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 18 (1985):
23-30, Bevilacqua does not mention that Campbell’s commonsensism also relates
him to Vico. For the hermeneutic significance of Reid, see my own ’Thomas
Reid on Common Sense." in Eighteenth Century Hermeneutics: Philosophy of
Interpretation in England from Locke to Burke (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press,
1993), 135-65.
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the process of addressing particular audiences in specific
rhetorical situations.
It follows that the perfected science of rhetoric can only be
found in concrete examples of it. Campbell the epistemologist
grudgingly concedes that “by the mere influence of example
on the one hand, and imitation on the other, some progress
may be made in an art, without the knowledge of the prin
ciples from which it sprung" (Ixix). Yet if there is another,
uncodifiable kind of knowledge, it cannot be learned from
precepts and principles:
practical knowledge can only be
learned by example. If knowing the formal rules of logic, as
Campbell the rhetorician argues, is not what makes a good
logician, then “true logic...is best studied not in a scholastic
system, but in the writings of the most judicious and best
reasoners on the various subjects supplied by history, science
and philosophy.”18 So also, we recall, for Campbell it is usage
that gives the law to grammar, not grammar to usage. Good
usage can therefore be learned only by imitating "whatever
modes of speech are authorized as good by the writings
of . celebrated authors" (145). Rhetoric, like all knowledge
irreducible to rule, must be learned by example and imitation.
Campbell the epistemologist raises the usual charge against
imitation: it precludes innovation and creativity. “Improvements...are not to be expected from those who have acquired
all their dexterity from imitation and habit”;
what they
produce is “commonly no more than a mere copy” (Ixix)
Those who know only the particular example, ana not the
general principle underlying it, can do no more than duplicate
it. Of course, those who learn only to follow the rule can
only produce more instances of it. What they cannot learn is
when to break the rule. The notion of a grace beyond the
reach of art is fundamental to anything claiming to be rhetor
ical knowledge. In Campbell’s view as in our own, rhetoric is
not merely perspicuous expression that achieves clarity by
obeying the laws prescribed by common usage. Eloquence
must have vivacity as well, and striking expressions are
typically uncommon and unconventional. For this reason,
neither parroting the particular nor following codified usage
can account for the highest rhetorical achievements. However
unqualified Campbell’s assertions, he is quite aware than

18 Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence, in Preacher and Pastor, 359.
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rhetorical art neither is or should be governed by the rules of
epistemic science. "To render the artificial or conventional
arrangement, as it were, sacred and inviolable, by representing
every deviation as a trespass against the laws of composition
in the language, is one of the most effectual ways of stinting
the powers of elocution, and even of damping the vigour both
of imagination and of passion" (365). No laws are inviolable,
for some violations are always justified.
In the violations endemic to metaphor, Campbell finds what
is always “an apparent, if it cannot be called a real im
propriety" (294).
Yet he hardly recommends avoiding all
metaphors because he recognizes that deviation from accepted
usage is essential to eloquence, and so there must be such a
thing as rhetorically appropriate deviation. Since no rule can
teach deviation as anything but improper, however, the
question arises where, if not from the rule book, the aspiring
orator is to learn it. Campbell’s answer is this: “Sometimes
indeed it is necessary, in order to set an eminent object in the
most conspicuous light, to depart a little from the ordinary
mode of composition as well as of arrangement. The following
[from Zachariah 1: 5] is an example in this way: "Your
fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live for
ever?" (364). Knowing whether, when, and how much to
depart from the prescriptions of usage constitutes the very
creativity essential to eloquence, and far from precluding
creativity, imitating is the only way of learning it.
The
judgment capable of discerning proper impropriety, as it were,
can be sharpened only by example.
Wittingly and unwittingly, Campbell shows that rhetorical
knowledge is indivisible from concrete example; it is practical
knowledge, and that comes only from practice itself. This
means, ultimately, from other people’s practice. Rhetoric can
only be learned dialogically, from one’s predecessors. We have
seen above that rhetoric cannot be conceived epistemically nor,
therefore, technologically; moreover, it cannot be conceived as
unilateral because it always registers the influence of the
speaker's particular auditors.
We can now conclude that
rhetoric cannot be conceived monologically either, since it is
learned from others, and nowhere else.
Perhaps we should have anticipated this conclusion, for it is
implicit in Campbell's expansion of rhetoric to coincide with
the sphere of all language. In this sphere it is most apparent
that speaking is learned dialogically, by hearing and imitating.
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Learning to speak is no epistemic process. As Campbell is
fully aware, “The knowledge of all the rules, both of derivation...and of construction, nay, and of all the words in the
language, is not the knowledge of the language” (190). What
constitutes "knowledge of the language,” then, if it is not to be
found in dictionaries and grammar books?
And what is
rhetorical knowledge, if identified with it?
We take our clue from Campbell’s assertion, repeated in
various contexts and various ways, that the knowledge in
question does not mean knowing all the rules of grammar and
diction. Knowledge of the language is not just epistemic and
theoretical, then. Language is most itself in the concrete, in
the speech act, in dialogue and conversation—which means in
practice. Knowing language is, simply, knowing how to speak,
and this is practical knowledge in the sense that it need not
involve any theoretical knowledge of definitions and grammar
at all. More than knowing-that, it consists in knowing-how.
Knowledge of the language does not mean knowing all the
rules; it means instead knowing how to apply them.
But what more, we might ask, does knowing how to apply
involve if it is not the same as knowing the rule itself? We
have seen that it involves discernment, which is knowing when
not to apply a rule, or when to break it, or when to apply it
to something so new that the rule itself is altered by the very
application of it. The point is not just that every speaker
doesn’t need to be a grammarian, but that every grammarian
who can speak knows more than just rules. Knowing how to
apply is in principle creative, and so is never just a matter of
applying rules. Knowledge of language is not knowledge of
some definable thing, for language is not an entity but a power
to create.
The same holds for words. Knowing how to use a word
never just means knowing its definition.
A speaker who
cannot use a word metaphorically, according to no previous
definition or convention of usage, does not know how to use
it. Perhaps for that very reason it is inexact to talk about
“using” words, as if they were tools in a tool box—given,
predefined, just waiting to be employed and returned unaltered.
So too Knowing how to speak does not mean “using”
language, as if language existed somewhere, apart from the use
of it before it is put to use. What can be known of language
in the abstract can be used, but it is not language. A dictionary or grammar book can be used, but knowing what is in
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them does not constitute knowledge of language. Speaking
cannot be imaged in the epistemological way as first coming up
with an idea to be expressed and then mentally thumbing
through vast language books, muttering to oneself, “Let’s see,
I want to say, 'Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.’ Now, what
grammar and vocabulary can I find to express this?” To know
what one wants to say is always already to know how to say
it. Speaking, then, cannot be understood as choosing from
among a pool of pregiven expressions the ones that will convey
some pregiven sense. The instrumentalist view of speaking
must be discarded. Language is not a “means of communication” because, in speaking, choosing one’s means is the same as
choosing what one means. In fact, it is much closer to the
ordinary experience of speaking to say that it involves no
choosing at all, no reflection on verbal means as separate from
nonverbal ends.
But isn’t it precisely this reflection that constitutes the art
of rhetoric—that is, the rhetor’s practice as governed by the
rhetorician’s knowledge of devices and rules, and explained by
the epistemologist’s knowledge of the principles of human
nature? If rhetoric consists in means / ends reflection, there is
good reason not to equate it with speaking generally, where
such reflection does not always occur. Ratner, rhetoric must
be confined to and defined as the technology of language. If,
however, we want to follow the line of Campbell’s thought
that identifies rhetoric with language, and if we want to begin
with his premise that knowledge of language does not mean
knowing rules and words, then rhetorical knowledge too
becomes something much different than Aristotelian rhetor
icians19 and Campbell himself had understood it to be.
On this new view, the philosopher’s task is not to explain
second-level knowledge, namely why the rhetorician’s rules
work, but to explain first-level knowledge, namely why the
rules, however useful, are always limited and never ultimately
sufficient to rhetorical practice. If the art of rhetoric cannot be
understood in a technological way, in terms of rules and
application, a philosophy of rhetoric devoted to first-level
knowledge stands epistemology on its head by refusing to
reduce rhetorical practice to theory. It refuses to admit the

19 For the view that ancient rhetoric had never been rule-based, see Douglas
McDermott, “George Campbell and the Classical Tradition,” Quarterly Journal of
Speech, 49 (1963): 403-09.
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primacy of episteme and thus consign rhetoric to the secondary
place of “communication.” Moreover, if rhetoric cannot be
explained in instrumental way as the “art by which the
discourse is adapted to its end,” then philosophy of rhetoric
will need to explain what rhetoric is, if not the mongrel
creature painted by epistemology, monstrously compounded of
end and means, what and how, sense and expression, logic and
grammar. A monistic philosophy of rhetoric as one and whole
will explain with Campbell against Campbell why it is not the
case that "to know is one thing, and to be capable of com
municating it another.”

